Talbott understood how deinstitutionalization had become the disaster that it was. There had been "no true testing of the tenets later given as the philosophic underpinnings of deinstitutionalization: for example, that community care is better than institutional care, that community care costs less than institutional care, and that care in the least restrictive setting is of higher quality." Likewise, there was no clear conceptualization as to what community care should consist of, and there had been little or no planning before or during deinstitutionalization. With the patients out of the hospital, community facilities had not begun to keep pace with the increased numbers of discharges and decreased numbers of admissions. Moreover, persons with mental illness who had had their needs met in one place—the hospitals—were now expected to seek out a host of community services that were not coordinated and were to be found in a variety of agencies. No comprehensive and integrated system of care—with designated responsibility, accountability, and adequate fiscal resources—existed in the community for persons with long-term and severe mental illness. As Talbott put it, "the disaster occurred because our mental health delivery system is not a system but a non-system." Deinstitutionalization also revealed the rank discrimination against long-term care and chronic illness by the mental health field, by governmental and private third-party reimbursers, by housing agencies, and by potential employers.