Do many of the trends in our field—treating target symptoms and receptors instead of people, blanketing with algorithms, the New Freedom Commission report's expectation that all mental disorders can be prevented or cured, "neurophilosophy" as a way of subsuming philosophy under science (2)—spring from a reductionistic worldview that science can solve everything? Treatment always involves the moral question of what should be done, and, as Gould shows, reductionism wrongly presumes that science can take on morality. Are we selling ourselves quasi-scientific promises that by their very nature cannot satisfy our primary humanitarian aim? And although psychiatry certainly bridges the worlds of science and the humanities, does most psychiatric clinical research, driven by dollars and desired clinical outcomes and largely devoid of skepticism, even constitute science? Gould's accounts of biased interpretations in the history of even the physical sciences remind us how dangerous the will to believe can be.